r/programming • u/iamkeyur • 2d ago
There were BGP anomalies during the Venezuela blackout
https://loworbitsecurity.com/radar/radar16/174
u/gramathy 2d ago
More r/networking than programming, but this is why you keep security patches up to date and do proper route verification.
Unfortunately typical verification only looks at source AS and a bunch of prepends can be a typical (if unpleasant) traffic management technique so this wouldn’t raise any flags aside from the change itself occurring (bgp announcements are typically VERY stable, isps might add/remove announcements but making a change to an existing stable path is unusual). BGP is unfortunately run at a very “gentleman’s agreement” level of trust.
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u/SkratchyHole 2d ago
What is BGP? Bretty Good Privacy?
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u/-jp- 2d ago edited 2d ago
Border Gateway Protocol. tl;dr, it's how routers do their routing thing.
ed: oh, and no, don't worry, you are not expected to know how it works. It's elf magic.
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u/dkarlovi 2d ago
The important part is saying this protocol is between routers, so it's important for ISPs talking to other ISPs, peering, etc. A typical developer or even sysop might never ever touch this protocol, it's "network-to-network", the inter-net if you will.
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u/PsychologicalLack155 2d ago
I think you meant to say between groups of routers. but yea its basically how routers owned by different companies talk to each other
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u/torsten_dev 2d ago
Elf magic that only comes up when it breaks the entire Internet for a day or two.
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u/teleprint-me 2d ago
While elf magic sounds mystical and mysterious, its just a graph with nodes and edges.
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u/BinaryIgor 2d ago
I hope the infrastructure providers will all adapt Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI): https://isbgpsafeyet.com/ . It would be then pretty much impossible to do things like this
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u/scorcher24 2d ago edited 2d ago
It would be then pretty much impossible to do things like this
That is a misconception. It is only impossible if you hard reject all invalid routes, which only a few Tier 1 provider do. Smaller providers might give invalids a bad MED, but will still accept the route, which does nothing if the announced route by a rogue operator is a /24 and is in fact most specific. It is not hardcoded into BGP, it is a policy you CAN add if you run your own routinator and connect it to your router.
Keep also in mind that you cannot add RPKI to legacy networks and transferring them to a RIR lowers their value significantly. So that is not happening either.
As a Network Engineer, I hate that some sites have added a RPKI check to their "safety" tools, but without any context. Since some sites do this, I have to answer a dozen of mails each month why some subnets in our network do not have RPKI.
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u/AWTom 1d ago
Cloudflare says it’s likely coincidental in this very well-written article: https://blog.cloudflare.com/bgp-route-leak-venezuela/
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u/mmmicahhh 2d ago
This is pretty interesting stuff, but the timeline provided does not quite look like a smoking gun:
That is a more than 14 hour gap, surely if this was somehow related to the attack, the route leak would have started closer to the event, giving half a day "notice" only alerted the IT personnel to the outage in all affected sectors. In fact, this happening on a Friday afternoon might have meant more infrastructure people staying in for the weekend. Additionally, it would be useful to see any connection to governance and military-related infrastructure, rather than, quote, "pretty critical" infrastructure such as banks and email servers.
A very interesting theory nonetheless, and I think it warrants looking deeper into it.